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*Department  of Economics,  University  of Maine The firm in Hyman Minsky's  financial  fragility hypothesis  is faced with 
competitive  pressures  and a market  economy which  is characterized  by business 
cycles  [Minsky 1975, Ch4-6;  1982b].  His firm is profit  and growth  oriented,  so 
that in the expansionary  phase of the business  cycle the firm invests expecting 
to reap the reward  of increased profits  as well as a larger share of the market. 
It is the sources of these funds that finance investment projects  that is the 
focus of Minsky's  hypothesis.  In this hypothesis  it is assumed  that internal 
sources of funds will  dry up before  investment projects  do, so the firm seeks 
external  funds.  Given  the increased  importance of debt and declining  use of 
equity  finance  since the 196Os,  it is the use of debt finance  that concerns 
Minsky.  In his hypothesis  the firm contracts  for debt,  investment  continues  and 
the balance  sheet of the firm reflects  the build up  in debt which  is the hallmark 
of financial  fragility. 
The financial  fragility hypothesis  draws no distinction  among firms with 
respect  to size, degree  of competition  in the market/industry,  sector  or product 
line.  The analysis  applies  to developed market  systems  in general.  It is the 
aim of this paper  to analyze  the generality  of the nature  of Minsky's  firm and 
the behavior  that in the aggregate  leads the economy  into a position  of financial 
fragility. 
This paper  is an empirical  investigation  of Minsky's  hypothesis  in the U.S. 
consumer  durables  sector during  the 1920s.  The first section of the paper 
briefly  describes  Minsky's  financial  fragility hypothesis,  while  the second 
sketches  a brief  economic historical  background  of the 1920s in the U.S..  The 
third section  introduces  the methodology  utilized  and the fourth presents  the 
results of the analysis.  In the conclusion  the findings  and their implications 
are summarized. Minsky's  Svstem 
The following  summary of Minsky's  financial  fragility hypothesis  is derived 
from his article  in Kindleberger  and Laffargue  [1982b].  In his hypothesis  firms 
are categorized  by their debt and income relationship.  The taxonomy  includes 
three types of firms.  These categories  are strictly definitional;  it is only in 
the business  cycle framework  that the behavioral  characteristics  of the firms 
become  apparent. 
The hedge-financed  firm has assets and liabilities  with  terms to maturities 
that are matched,  and it has expected  income flows that exceed  its debt payments. 
Using Minsky's  notation  the hedge  firm is characterized  as 
(1)  AQi > PC,  (i = 1,  .  .  ..n> 
where AQi is the anticipated  income, net income, for each period  and 
contracted  debt service payment  in each period.  Hence,  this firm is 
conservatively  financed.  It is the only firm in the Minsky  taxonomy 
total anticipated  income exceeds  total debt payments  in each period, 
the expected  income  is greater  than the debt service payment. 
PC, is the 
described  as 
in which 
and in which 
The second  firm is the speculative-financed  firm.  It is also characterized 
by a total expected  income stream  that exceeds  it total debt payments.  However, 
it differs  from the previous  firm in that in the initial m periods  of the life of 
the investment  project  the income in each period will be less than the contracted 
debt service payment  in that period.  During  these m periods which Minsky 
considers  to be over a small time period,  the interest portion  of the debt 
payment will be smaller  than the expected  income in each period,  so the firm by 
at least remaining  current  on its interest payments  will not 
an attempt  to maintain  a good credit rating,  the speculative 
restructure  its debt during  these initial m periods.  It will 
go into arrears.  In 
firm will usually 
either  renegotiate 3 
its existing  debt or contract  for new borrowings.  After  these first m periods 
have passed,  the expected  income in each period  exceeds  the debt payments,  so the 
firm is again on a stable  financial  footing. 
Using  our previous  notation  to describe  the speculative  firm, it is 
characterized  as 
(2)  AQi < PC,  (i = l,...,m. m is small) 
(3)  AQi > PC,(y) (i = l,...,m) 
(4)  AQi > PC,  (i = m+l,...,n) 
(5)  CAQi > CPCi  (i = l,...,n) 
where  PCi(y)  is the interest portion  of the debt payment. 
The financial  structure  of the speculative  firm has greater debt exposure 
than the hedge  firm and therefore  carries with  it greater risk.  In addition, 
unlike  the hedge  firm, the speculative  firm must return  to the credit market 
during  its first m time periods which  indicates  that it faces increased 
uncertainty  and therefore  a greater vulnerability.  The credit market  conditions 
will have changed  since the firm's  initial foray into the market.  These changes 
may be  for the best or the worst;  the crucial point  is that the future  is unknown 
and unknowable.  This latter point  is the one that Minsky  emphasizes;  it also is 
another  reason  for a higher  risk level adhering  to such a firm. 
The final firm is the Ponzi firm.  Structurally,  it is an exaggerated 
speculative  firm.  Like the other two firms,  it, too, has a total expected  income 
summed  over all periods  that exceeds  its total debt commitment.  Its difference 
arises  from the extended number  of periods  during which  the firm has expected 
income that is less than the contracted  debt payments;  instead of m,  it has n-l 
periods.  Also  during  these deficit periods  the interest portion  of the debt 
exceeds  the expected  income.  So, like the speculative  firm, the Ponzi  firm must 4 
again go to the credit market  to obtain a financial  solution.  Instead  of merely 
being  able to renegotiate  existent  debt, the Ponzi firm must  incur additional 
debt if it is to meet  its interest payments  or its debt payments  during  the first 
n-l periods.  It is only in the final period, n, that the Ponzi firm makes  a 
windfall  gain so that it can validate  its total debt commitment.  An example of 
such a firm would be  in the residential  construction  industry.  The construction 
firm begins  a new investment program which  is building  houses.  It borrows  the 
entire  sum for this project.  The income from the investment  project  arrives  only 
in the final period,  n, when  a consumer  takes a mortgage  out on the house.  The 
construction  debt is only then extinguished,  validated,  assuming  that the house 
sold  at  a price  that at least equalled  its total cost.  Using  our previous 
notation  the Ponzi firm is characterized  as 
(6)  AQi < PC,  (i = l,...,n-1) 
(7)  AQi <  PC,(y) (i = l,...,n-1) 
(8)  AQi >> PC,  (i = n) 
(9)  CAQi > CPCi  (i = l,...,n) 
where >> indicates  the windfall  gain of the final period. 
The increased uncertainty  faced by the speculative  firm is compounded  by 
the financial position  taken by the Ponzi firm.  Any deterioration  in the credit 
market,  rising  interest rates,  credit rationing  or declining  debt instrument 
prices, will have  a deleterious  effect on the Ponzi firm.  Since it has placed 
itself  in such an initially precarious  position,  any further deterioration  in its 
financial  position  may mean bankruptcy. 
Minsky  produces  a macroeconomic  effect  from this microfoundation  by placing 
his  firms in a business  cycle economy.  It is in this business  cycle  framework 
that the dynamic  of the financial  fragility hypothesis  becomes  apparent. Beginning  in the early expansion  phase of a business  cycle the majority  of firms 
should be hedge  firms.  Since this phase  is renown as the most profitable  phase 
of the cycle,  the primary  source of investment  finance will be  internal. 
However,  as the expansion  extends,  internal funds dwindle,  competition 
intensifies  for market  share, expectations  as to the continuation  of the 
expansion  rise as does debt usage.  The continuing  expansion  is fueled by  the 
debt-financed  investment  expenditures,  while  at the level of the firm, these debt 
obligations  build up on the balance  sheet causing a change  in the firm's 
financial position.  The expectations  of the continuation  of the expansion  are 
the foundation  for the continued  investment  expenditures  along with  the 
assumption  that debt used to finance such expenditures  will be validated.  The 
result of this rose-colored  psychology  is the movement  from hedge  to speculative 
and in some cases Ponzi positions  of finance. 
This  increased use of debt produces  more than just a quantitative  change; 
there is also a qualitative  decline.  Given a positively  sloped yield  curve which 
is typical  in a business  expansion,  short term interest rates are lower than long 
term rates.  In the interest of cost minimization  some firms will use short term 
liabilities  as a temporary  finance for their long term assets.  While  reducing 
cost in the short run, this behavior  raises balance  sheet risk even when  it is 
undertaken  as purely  stop-gap  finance.  Such mismatching  of the terms to maturity 
increases borrower's  risk and is integral in the move  towards  financial 
fragility. 
The combination  of this qualitative  balance  sheet deterioration  with  the 
quantitative  deterioration  induced by the increase  in debt usage,  indicates  the 
manner  in which  a more  financially  fragile position  is taken by the firm.  Given 
the macroeconomic  pressures  of the business  cycle expansion  and the microeconomic 6 
motivations  of the firms,  this competitive  investment behavior  leads not just 
firms, but sectors and possibly  the whole economy,  towards a financially  fragile 
position.  This fragility  is seen as firms' debt structures move  from hedge  to 
speculative,  from speculative  to Ponzi, or from Ponzi to bankruptcy  in some 
cases.  Bankruptcy  or Ponzi finance  is not the necessary  end of a financially 
fragile  firm.  All that the hypothesis  requires  is an increasingly  heavy  debt 
load compared  to income or assets.  This behavior  replicated  throughout  the 
economy puts  it into a more precarious  financial position.  Such a position  might 
induce a liquidity  crisis or a Great Depression.  The determinants  of the 
macroeconomic  outcome  are the extent of speculative  and Ponzi financing  positions 
throughout  the economy along with  the policy  responses  of the monetary  and fiscal 
authorities. 
Minsky's  financial  fragility hypothesis  builds  on a microeconomic 
foundation  to produce  macroeconomic  effects.  While most of the empirical 
evidence  on this hypothesis  draws on the U.S. post-World  War II macroeconomy, 
some sectoral  analyses have  also been undertaken.l  Investigating  the financial 
behavior  of a sector rather  than the macroeconomy  allows  for a more  detailed view 
of the micro units.  As  long as the microcosm,  the sector, exhibits  the required 
expansionary  behavior,  then the framework necessary  to the financial  fragility 
hypothesis  is in place. 
The U.S.  in the 1920s 
The popular view of the 1920s in the U.S.  as a roaring  and prosperous 
period  is not without  merit.  The technological  inventions  and innovations 
introduced  in this period  led to increases  in productivity  as well  as new or 
improved consumer  goods.2  As charted by the National  Bureau  for Economic 
Research  (NBER), the aggregate  level economic  activity between  1922 and 1929 experienced  only two minor 
rate for the decade was 4% 
downturns,  1924 and 1927.3  The average  annual  growth 
Given the severity of the 1920-21 recession, 
economic  growth  in the remainder  of the decade had to be strong  for a 4% growth 
rate to be attained.  As John Kenneth Galbraith  [1962:8] has put it, 
. . . The twenties  in America were a very  good time. 
Production  and employment were high  and rising.  Wages 
were not going up much, but prices were stable. 
Although  many people were still very poor, more people 
were  comfortably  well-off,  well-to-do,  or rich than 
ever before.  Finally, American  capitalism was 
undoubtedly  in a lively phase.  Between  1925 and 1929, 
the number  of manufacturing  establishments  increased 
from 183,900  to 206,700;  the value  of their output 
rose from $60.8 billions  to $68.0 billions.  The 
Federal Reserve  index of industrial production  which 
had averaged  only 67 in 1921  (1923-25=100) had risen 
to 110 by July  1928, and it reached  126 in June 1929. 
This flourishing  economy provided  the primary  rationale  for the stock 
market's  boom. 
maldistribution 
and, above all, 
Other  factors aiding  in its rise included  "...a 
of income, high  rates of profit,  a plentiful  supply of credit 
investor confidence...."  [Fearon, 1987:117]  The tremendous 
growth  in the overall  economy  coupled with  these other factors produced  an 
even more phenomenal  growth  in the stock market.  The economy  rose out of its 
1920-21 recession  to almost  double  its output value by  1929 whereas,  the stock 
market  almost  quadrupled  its value by  1929.  Starting with an index value  of 
56 in 1921  (1935-9=100),  the value  of the market  increased  to 153 in 1928 and 
201 in 1929  [Fearon, 1987:117].  This  investor confidence  abedded by the 
duration  of the market's  expansion  and an abundant  supply  of credit  altered 
the perception  of stock market  investment  from that of a speculative  act of 
gambling  to that of a risk-free  assured  investment  [Soule, 1947:293-2961. 
The creation  of such a state of confidence  is the element most critical 
to Minsky's  hypothesis  since it is responsible  for promoting  financial 8 
fragility  [Minsky 1982a].  This enhanced confidence  affects  the investment 
decision-making  process.  It reduces  the perception  of lender's  and borrower's 
risk associated  with  debt finance so that both  the lender and borrower  are 
increasingly  willing  to undertake  bold  investment projects.  These projects 
with their  "unseen" risk have a greater chance of not generating  the income 
than was expected  leaving the firm in a financially vulnerable  position. 
Given  the 1920s state of confidence  the question becomes  one of whether 
speculative  and Ponzi financing were dominant  in the 1920s. 
Raymond  Goldsmith  [1956] in his exhaustive  study on savings  in America 
provides  a useful  overview  of debt usage during  the 1920s.  Using historical 
cost data for asset valuation  and book value  for debt, the debt-to-asset 
ratios  for the non-financial  private  sector were generated  for his benchmark 
years.  This ratio was 0.30 in 1922 and 0.31 in 1929.  An alternative  measure 
of Goldsmith's  figures,  assets at replacement  cost and debt at market  value, 
is presented  in Taggart  [1986:24].  He shows that in 1922 the debt-to-asset 
ratio was 0.28, and in 1929 it was 0.28.  Irrespective  of measure,  the 1920s 
do not appear  to have been  financially  fragile. 
Given  that both  of these measures  fail to pick up a major  increase  in 
the use of debt,  it does not appear  that there was a significant  change  in 
debt usage  in the "roaring Twenties".  However,  these data only allow a spot 
check at the benchmark  years  and they only capture macroeconomic  phenomena.  A 
more detailed,  continuous  microeconomic  examination  may uncover  another  story. 
Methodology 
The consumer  durables  sector was chosen as the focus for this study for 
several reasons.  First,  the consumer  durables  sector was a growth  sector 
during  the 1920's.  Many economic historians  have gone so far as to call this 9 
the period  of the consumer  durables  "revolution".4  The electrification  of the 
home was  in full swing;  the automobile market was reaching  a point  of 
saturation;  and the development  of credit  institutions  and instruments 
necessary  to promote  consumer  durables purchases  was under way  [Fearon, 
1987:Chaps  3 and 9, et passim.].  Not only did the sector have a strong  growth 
pattern,  there was also a variety  of technologically  innovative  industries  in 
it.  While  these major  inventions were being  disseminated  as products  and 
processes,  the sector also encompassed  industries  such as furniture which were 
in a mature  phase of growth.  These qualities  of growth,  innovation  and 
maturity  made  this sector a good choice  for this study. 
The methodological  approach  employed  to investigate  the Minskian 
hypothesis  in the 1920s is a financial  analysis utilizing  the following  tools: 
sources and uses of funds, financial  ratio analysis  and Moodv's  Manual  of 
Industrials  bond credit  ratings.5  The analysis  is organized by firm size so 
that the similarities  and differences  arising  from size can be observed.  The 
sources  and uses analysis  employed, while  a variation  on the traditional 
method,  reveals  the firm's expenditures  on growth and production  as well as 
its method  of finance.  The financial  ratio analysis puts  the growth  and 
investment-financing  decisions  into a larger perspective  with  respect  to the 
firm's  income and equity position.6  Moody's  credit ratings  indicate  the risk 
perceptions  of a professional  market watchdog.  These act as a proxy  for the 
market's  view of risk with respect  to the firm's debt exposure. 
The data set consisting  of firms' balance  sheets was drawn from Moody's. 
The balance  sheet variables  used  include plant and equipment  expenditures, 
current  assets,  current  liabilities,  long term debt and earned  surplus.  The 
financial  ratios utilized  include total debt-to-net  worth  (TD/NW), long term 10 
debt-to-net  worth  (LT/NW), short term debt-to-net  worth  (ST/NW), the current 
ratio  (CURR), the quick ratio  (QUICK), and short term-to-long  term debt ratio 
(ST/LT). 
Whereas,  the primary  evidence  for financial  fragility  lies with  the 
values  of the balance  sheet variables  and the changes  in the ratio values  over 
time, an additional  indicator  of fragility  is provided  by the changes  in the 
credit  ratings  given to the firms on their outstanding  bonds by Moodv's.  A 
summary of the upgradings  and downgradings  on these bonds  completes  the 
financial  analysis. 
The balance  sheet variables,  financial  ratios and the credit  ratings 
changes  are organized  into financial  analyses  on average  "firms".  These 
"firms" represent  the entire  sector as well as being  disaggregated  into small, 
medium  and large firms.  This averaging process  allows  a behavior  pattern 
typical of each size firm to emerge without  a major  loss of information.  A 
more detailed  description  of the derivation  of the variables,  ratios  and 
"firms" is provided  in the Appendix. 
Consumer  Durables  in the 1920s 
Sectoral  Behavior 
The summary variables  and ratios  for the average  sectoral  "firm" are 
provided  in Table  1.  The trend of these numbers  indicates  a strong  expansion 
throughout  the sector  that was primarily  financed with  internal  funds.  Plant 
and equipment  increased by more  than 100% from 1920 to 1929, while  earned 
surplus  grew by over 200%.  Current assets  and liabilities  peaked  in 1928. 
While  current  assets  do not quite double,  they do grow in response  to the 
increased  demand  for variable  capital due to the plant and equipment 
expansion.  Current  liabilities,  since their nature  is short term, would not 11 
necessarily  be expected  to grow at the same rate as current  assets  or plant 
and equipment.  Rather,  their maturities  could have been  shortened  or part of 
the variable  capital  could have been  financed out of profits.  However,  its 
trend and cyclical behaviors  match  that of current  assets rather  closely.  One 
of the most  striking behaviors  is that of long term debt which  fell by 90% 
from 1920 to 1929. 
The financial  ratios  offer another view of this "firm", but  they provide 
essentially  the same perspective  of conservative  financial behavior.  All of 
the debt-to-net  worth  ratios  declined between  1920 and 1929.  Starting  the 
decade  at  0.47, the TD/NW declined  to 0.20 by 1929.'  The liquidity measures, 
the current  and quick ratios,  also provided  evidence  for the sustained  liquid 
position  of the "firm".  The only time the quick ratio indicated  an illiquid 
position  was  in 1920 when  the highly  liquid assets were worth  only 63% of its 
short term liabilities.  Yet,  the value  of current ratio  in 1920 signifies 
that the "firm" could have used  its current assets  to pay off its short term 
debt. 
Finally,  the short term-to-long  term debt ratio upon  initial viewing 
appears  to indicate a major movement  away from long term debt at the beginning 
of the decade  into short term debt after 1925.  Such a move would  signal  a 
move  towards  fragility  if this debt were  funding long term assets.  A look at 
the balance  sheet variables  makes  it obvious  that it is not.  Internal  finance 
was being  substituted  for long term debt.  All the indicators point  to the 
fact that this "firm" was  in a stronger  financial position  in 1929 than in 
1920. 
A cyclical  analysis  of this period produces  a little different  outcome. 
An NBER charting  of the cycles  in the 1920s produces  3 full trough-to-trough 12 
cycles,  1919-1921,  1921-1924,  1924-1927,  and the 1927-1929  expansion  [Burns 
and Mitchell,  1946:105].  After  the 1921 trough was reached  the consumer 
durables's  expansion was marred  only slightly by the 1924 and 1927 downturns. 
Plant and equipment  expenditures  rate of expansion  slowed  in 1924 and 1925, 
rebounded  in 1926 and then settled  into a relatively  constant  rate of growth 
through 1929.  The growth  rate of earned  surplus experienced  greater  swings 
amplitude,  but,  again,  it always  remained positive.  Its growth  slowed  in 
1924, picked  up  in 1925 and thereafter  on an annual basis  continued  this 
oscillatory  behavior.  However,  even with  these cycles  the "firm" was able to 
internally  finance  its expansion.  Current assets and liabilities  were more 
sensitive  to these cycles.  Their values  declined  in 1924, rebounded  in 1925, 
continued  their growth  through  1927 and peaked  in 1928.  The coincident  cycles 
of these two variables  evidence  a matching  of their terms to maturities. 
The cyclical  changes  in the financial  ratios' values  fail to provide  any 
additional  information.  Their cyclical  activity was dominated by  the secular 
behavior,  so  no new evidence  of financial  fragility was provided. 
All of the evidence whether viewed  from the cyclical  or secular 
perspective  indicates  that the sectoral  "firm" remained  in a solid financial 
position  throughout  the decade and had by  its end reached an even more 
resilient  position.  It appears  that internal funds were  the primary  source  of 
investment  finance and that short term debt financed  operating  capital 
purchases,  not plant  and equipment. 
Small, Medium  and Large  "Firms" 
The disaggregation  of the average consumer  durables  "firm" into its 
small, medium  and large components  reveals only minor  differences  from the 
sectoral  "firm".  Tables  2, 3 and 4 detail  the financial behavior  of these TABLE  1 
SECTOPALFIRM 
YEAR  PLANT  6  CURRENT  CURRENT 
EQUIPMENT  ASSETS  DEBT 
IOOQ)  (000)  (000) 
1919  80,373 
1920  125,239 
1921  123,836 
1922  127.759 
1923  145,096 
1924  159,606 
1925  166,065 
1926  219,669 
1927  239,344 
1928  261,376 
1929  281,101 
1930  280.538 
1.  Components  may  not 
165,594  56,565 
172,321  80,834 
110,137  59,409 
141,390  44.347 
197,613  57.047 
168.323  42,363 
254.898  66,952 
276,340  70,098 
290,139  75,739 
295,165  BB.881 
278,237  71,261 
238.917  48,911 
sum to total  due  to  rounding  errors. 
YEAR  PUNT& 
EOUIPHENT 
(000, 
1919  61,936 
1920  90,406 
1921  89.655 
1922  89.490 
1923  100,507 
1924  110,856 
1925  116.876 
1926  146,149 
1927  157,869 
1928  170,120 
1929  -  179,200 
1930  177,581 
1.  conponents  may  not 
LONG-TEPJ!  EARNED 
DEBT  SURPLUS 
(000)  (000) 
10,976  89,095 
7,639  90,702 
8,466  72.534 
6,829  96,813 
6.542  153,213 
5,778  160,799 
3,467  193,095 
3,453  202,296 
2,781  227,592 
2,758  248,232 
673  305,370 
922  303,831 
CURRENT  CURRENT 
ASSETS  DEBT 
(000)  (000) 
146,676  54.049 
148.620  65,512 
130,277  48.458 
121,179  32.144 
165,183  40,806 
178.96%  32,790 
209.287  46.587 
221.12B  46.878 
220,722  48.864 
226.990  59,751 
217.557  50,213 
214.765  33,736 
TABLE  2 
LARGE  FIRM 
LDNG-TERM  EARNED 
DEBT  SURPLUS 
(000)  (000) 
10,396  73,735  0.45  0.36  0.08  0.79  310.01  2.92 
9,784  70,316  0.44  0.37  0.07  0.47  1.56  2.54 
13,052  59,674  0.38  0.28  0.10  1.02  0.51  3.97 
13,277  75,460  0.26  0.14  0.12  1.07  0.44  6.38 
12,069  119,083  0.26  0.15  0.11  1.20  0.52  6.94 
10,961  127,657  0.20  0.11  0.09  1.82  0.64  7.79 
8,015  152,042  0.21  0.15  0.06  1.73  3.06  6.02 
7,901  16t.460  0.21  0.15  0.07  1.57  2.71  5.72 
6,521)  175,007  0.19  0.14  0.05  1.83  3.81  5.61 
6.341)  185,933  0.21  0.16  0.05  1.70  6.37  4.72 
2,418  225,081  0.18  0.12  0.06  1.38  6.34  6.31 
2.238  225,664  0.15  0.09  0.06  1.96  3.61  6.80 
sum to total due  to  rounding  tx-rors. 
TD/NW'  ST/NW  LT/Nw  QUICK  ST/LT  CURRENT 
RATIO 
0.47  0.41  0.05  1.03  50.56  3.51 
0.54  0.49  0.05  0.63  0.93  2.79 
0.46  0.40  0.06  1.21  0.40  3.82 
0.35  0.29  0.06  1.16  0.66  4.76 
0.26  0.21  0.05  0.95  0.62  4.59 
0.21  0.17  0.04  1.50  0.84  5.66 
0.24  0.21  0.03  1.47  2.25  5.13 
0.23  0.20  0.03  1.41  2.11  5.79 
0.22  0.19  0.03  1.61  3.15  5.59 
0.23  0.21  0.02  1.43  5.49  4.52 
0.20  0.18  0.02  1.01  6.15  4.76 
0.15  0.12  0.02  1.89  3.46  7.02 
TD/NW'  ST/NW  LT/NU  QUICK  ST/LT  CURRENT 
RATIO 13 
firms.  The most outstanding  difference  is seen in the divergence  between  the 
small  "firm's" financial behavior  and that of the large and medium  "firms". 
While none of the "firms" in any size category moved  into a financially 
fragile position,  the small "firm" did leave the decade more highly  leveraged 
than when  it entered. 
As seen in Table  2, the financial behavior  of the large "firm" deviated 
little  from the sectoral  "firm".  Since the large firms in the sector 
accounted  for the major portion  of sectoral activity,  it was to be expected 
that these "firms"' behaviors  would be coincident.  The financial position  of 
the large firm, like the sectoral, became more  solid as the decade progressed. 
Moody's  credit  ratings on these large firms' bonds  also reflect  this 
stability.  Disaggregating  the decade  into two periods,  1922-1926  and 1927- 
1929, so that the expansions  are highlighted,  produces  a temporal  framework 
which  the credit  ratings  can be used  to gauge fragility.  During  the decade 
in 
the six large firms had eight outstanding  bond  issues, and they made  one new 
issue.  The outstanding  issues maintained  their initial ratings,  and the new 
issue of 1929 was  the only downgrading.  While  all of the outstanding  bonds 
were at least investment  grade, Baa, the majority  were Aaa.  The only bond 
rating below  Baa was the new issue which had a Ba rating. 
The medium  "firm" stands  in contrast  to the large  "firm": it entered  the 
period  in a highly  leveraged position,  its expansion  program  was  inconsistent 
and it left the decade with relatively high debt ratios.  Its pattern  of debt 
decline, however,  was consistent  with  that of the large firm.  As seen in 
Table  3, the growth  of this "firm" was not breath-taking;  it was sporadic.  In 
each expansion  current  assets were  the first to grow, and then plant  and 
equipment  followed.  Financing was carried out through a combination  of earned TABLE  3 
MEDIUW  FiRn 
PLANT  L  CURRENT  CURRENT  LONG-TERM  EARNED 
1919  7,335  18,303  7.934  044  6,956  1.18  0.99  0.05  1.46  4.20  6.87 
1920  9,075  18.069  11,396  1,476  5,394  1.17  1.11  0.06  0.69  2.47  5.07 
1921  9,661  15,430  10,942  1,592  4,951  1.18  1.10  0.08  1.38  1.66  6.65 
1922  9,480  14.487  10,776  1,499  3,474  1.05  0.98  0.07  0.82  2.40  5.53 
1923  10,543  21,067  9,918  036  4,906  0.55  0.51  0.04  1.69  3.68  4.80 
1924  10.004  21,010  9,270  651  4,256  0.48  0.45  0.03  1.01  3.79  4.46 
1925  10,034  20,981  8,710  582  4,622  0.44  0.41  0.03  1.89  3.40  5.88 
1926  10.277  21,223  8,314  829  4,601  0.49  0.37  0.12  2.11  4.34  8.89 
1927  9,597  22,299  9,242  747  4,962  0.54  0.40  0.15  1.81  3.90  9.14 
1928  9.585  25,569  9,851  289  7,479  0.40  0.36  0.03  1.52  2.28  5.49 
1929  15,352  33,722  15,102  2,154  9,006  0.50  0.44  0.06  1.48  3.46  5.10 
1930  19.418'  25,799  10,530  4,666  7,716  0.41  0.26  0.15  1.70  5.10  8.29 
EQUIPMENT  ASSETS  DEBT  DEBT  SURPLUS 
f 000)  (0001  (000)  (000)  (000) 
Components  may  not sum to  total  due  to rounding  errors. 
YEAR  PIANTC  CVPJZENT  CURRENT 
EQUIPHENT  ASSETS  DEBT 
(000)  (000)  (000) 
1919  1.501  3,793  918 
1920  1,939  4,459  1,258 
1921  2,169  3,691  791 
1922  2,159  4,044  843 
1923  2,131  4.4B4  910 
1924  2,321  4,507  766 
1925  2,323  4,786  899 
1926  2.314  5,060  -r  845 
1927  2,357  4.971  BE6 
1928  2,353  5,331  992 
1929  2,672  5,512  1,133 
1930  2,615  4,723  813 
1.  Components  may  not  s”m to  total  due  to  * 
TABLE  4 
SHALL  FIRI 
LONG-TERH  EARNED 
DEBT  SURPLUS 
(000)  (000) 
174  1,502 
418  1,689 
444  1,558 
340  1.797 
328  1,683 
332  1.824 
390  1.658 
307  1,896 
365  1,934 
343  1,956 
541  2,257 
452  1,570 
rounding  errors. 
TD/NW'  ST/NW  LT/NW  QUICK  ST/LT  CURRENT 
RATIO 
TD/NW'  ST/NW  LT/NW  QUICK  ST/LT 
0.32  0.29  0.03  0.82  1.59  6.09 
0.41  0.34  0.07  0.78  1.09  5.04 
0.39  0.28  0.09  1.01  0.53  6.03 
0.34  0.21  0.11  1.38  1.86  6.85 
0.32  0.21  0.10  1.35  1.70  7.41 
0.26  0.16  0.09  2.19  1.17  10.30 
0.29  0.18  0.11  1.66  0.95  0.66 
0.30  0.19  0.12  1.23  0.64=  7.58 
0.30  0.19  0.11  1.60  1.72  7.17 
0.31  0.20  0.10  1.76  3.26  6.93 
0.34  0.23  0.12  1.09  1.07  6.44 
0.31  0.20  0.11  2.52  1.40  11.54 
CURRENT 
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surplus,  short and long term debt.  The maturities  of assets  and liabilities 
were matched,  so it was using a very conservative  financing  technique. 
The medium  "firm" appeared  to be over-leveraged  at the beginning  of the 
decade, yet by  its end it had attained  a stable financial position.  This 
movement  towards a more resilient  financial position  is seen in the secular 
reduction  of the debt ratios.  The ST/NW ratio decreased which  caused  the 
TD/NW ratio to also decline.  While  the ST/NW fell by more  than half by the 
end of the decade,  its 1929 value,  0.50, was higher  than the peak values 
attained by  the other  "firms".  The liquidity  ratios also followed  this 
pattern.  Their values  may have been higher  in the middle  of the decade  than 
at its end, but after 1922 their values  indicated  that the "firm" maintained  a 
liquid position. 
Just as the medium  "firm's" debt reduction pattern mirrored  the large 
"firm's",  its bond  credit  ratings's  also reflected  the same pattern.  There 
were  three bond  issues outstanding  during  the 1920s.  Two had ratings  that 
remained  constant  throughout  the decade, and one issue had a rating  reduction 
in the 1927-29 period.  All of these bonds maintained  ratings  at investment 
grade, Baa, or above.  The maintenance  of the ratings was an indicator  from 
the market  that even with  its higher  debt ratios,  the medium  "firm" was not 
speculatively  financed. 
Finally,  as seen in Table 4 the small "firm" experienced  an even smaller 
and more cyclical  growth pattern  than the medium  "firm's".  Growth  in plant 
and equipment  was counter-cyclical.  Since earned  surplus was usually  pro- 
cyclical,  this forced the "firm" into a stronger  debt dependency.  The small 
"  firm" used both  short and long term finance  to finance  its growth, where  long 
term debt  included mortgages  and bonds.  Given  that the small firm category 15 
includes  firms with assets up to $5 million,  it was not unusual  for the larger 
small firms to have  enough market  recognition  to float bonds.  This reliance 
on debt shows itself  in the 
worth  ratios  in the decade. 
The small  "firm" came 
secular and cyclical  changes  in the debt-to-net 
into the 1920s with a lower TD/NW ratio than the 
one it had when  it left.  The rise in TD/NW from a 0.32 in 1919 to 0.34 in 
1929 is minimal,  yet  it stands  in opposition  to the behavior  of the other 
"firms".  Even waiting  until  1922 to start the comparison  produces  a secular 
picture  in which  there is no change  in the leverage ratio.  Over the decade 
the ST/NW ratio experienced  a secular decline, but  it was overshadowed  by the 
secular rise  in the LT/NW ratio which was the cause of the TD/NW rise.  The 
changes  in the ST/LT ratio are evidence  of the changing  importance  of these 
two debt maturities.  Even though the small  "firm" increased  its debt burden 
over the decade,  the use of long term debt as finance meant  that maturities 
were matched  so that additional  risk to the "firm" was kept  to a minimum.  The 
cyclical  analysis  shows TD/NW  increasing  in expansions  after 1921 which  is a 
behavior  that coincides with  the financial  fragility hypothesis. 
The values  of the liquidity  ratios  indicate that the small  "firm" 
increased  it state of liquidity  as the decade progressed.  These  ratios 
experienced  cyclical  changes, but the values were always higher  than they had 
been upon entering  the decade.  The profile  of the small  "firm" that emerges 
from this analysis  of the financial  ratios  is that of a "firm" that must rely 
upon debt finance  for its expansion, however,  it uses very  conservative 
financing  techniques. 
There were  ten small firms out of the total of 45 that had outstanding 
bond  issues.  Altogether  there were eleven outstanding  issues, nine of which 16 
had no change  in their ratings.  The two issues that had ratings  changes 
experienced  three downgrades  in the 1922-1926 period  and three in the 1927-29 
period.  Compared  to the medium  and large "firms" records,  the small  "firm" 
appeared  to be a greater credit risk.  A greater portion  of the grades  their 
bonds were  given reflected  speculative  financing.'  Some of these issues 
initially had Aa ratings, but Baa was the most common  initial grade.  Both of 
these ratings  are lower starting  grades  than the other  "firms" had.  In the 
downgrading  process  the other  "firms" remained  at or above  investment  grade, 
but the small firms had 5, almost one-half  of their outstanding  issues, rated 
as less than an investment  grade bond by the end of the decade.  No issue was 
rated less than a B, but  today, a bond with  this rating would be  termed a 
"junk" bond.g 
Conclusion 
The financial behavior  of the consumer  durables  sector  at both  levels of 
aggregation,  sector and "firm", assumed a different profile  than that 
hypothesized  by Minsky.  The sector appeared  to have reduced  its financial 
vulnerability  as the twenties  ensued,  so that it entered  the Great Depression 
in a stronger position  than it entered  the 1920s.  While  the large  "firm" 
reflected  the same behavior  as the sector, the medium  and small  "firms" each 
deviated  from that pattern  in some manner.  The medium  "firm", like the 
sector, experienced  an enhanced  financial position by  the end of the decade, 
but even then it had debt ratios  that were higher  than the peak values  of the 
other  "firms".  The small  "firm" experienced  at best a secular  constancy  in 
its debt ratios  over the decade.  This behavior  was due to the cyclical 
financial  activity  of the "firm".  The small "firm" was  the only one to 
exhibit  financial behavior  partially  confirming  the fragility hyp0thesis.l' 17 
The results  of this investigation  provide  little support  for Minsky's 
hypothesis.  Firm size appears  to be a major determinant  of financial 
behavior.  It is apparent  that size and profitability,  whether  in a secular  or 
cyclical  framework,  have a positive  relationship,  and that the large and 
medium  "firms" were more able to rely upon internal finance  for their 
expansions.  In contrast  to these  "firms", the small "firm" relied more 
consistently  on external  debt funds.  Given these results  it would  appear  that 
the Minskian  financial  scenario  is a specific case and that the more general 
case might be  found in theories of the firm/investment  that emphasize  the 
generation  of internal  funds for finance. 
Appendix 
The study draws  its financial  information  from Moody's  Manual  of 
Industrials  for the years  1919 through 1930.  Since balance  sheet information 
was  the most  consistently  reported  of the financial  statements,  it forms the 
backbone  of the analysis.  Firms in the consumer  durables  sector  that had 1) 
commenced  operation by  1922, 2) remained  in business  for at least 5 years and 
3) reported  their positions  in December  on an annual basis were used  in the 
study.  Thus,  59 firms were  included for analysis.  These  firms represent  the 
automobile,  household  furnishings,  household  appliances  and musical 
instruments  industries.  Their sizes range from $0.5 million  to $920 million 
in assets.  The small firm with up to $20 million  in assets  is represented  by 
45 firms.ll  The medium  firm with assets  totaling over $20 million  and under 
$40 million  is represented  by eight firms.  The large firm of which  there are 
six, has assets  totaling  over $40 million.  By the end of 1934, fourteen  of 
these firms had declared bankruptcy.  Of these, one was  large, one was medium, 
and twelve were  small. 18 
To provide  interfirm  comparability  a standardized  balance  sheet was 
compiled  for each firm for each year of operation.  While undertaking  this 
transformation,  it was discovered  that several firms altered  their fiscal year 
closing  dates.  In order to maintain  comparability  each balance  sheet had to 
reflect  the same incremental  time period. 
In these cases the actual balance  sheet time periods were  transformed 
into 12 month periods by a linear transformation.  For instance,  a firm that 
reported  in December  1920 and then again in March  1921 would have  to be 
transformed.  This was  implemented by taking the balance  sheet changes between 
the two time periods  and scaling  them up by a factor of 4.  This extrapolation 
was added on to the December  1920 balance  sheet to produce  a December  1921 
report.  The succeeding  years,  if the firm failed  to return  to a December  end 
of the fiscal year, were  treated  similarly.  This produced  a uniform  time 
period, but altered  the actual values  of balance  sheet items.  These 
extrapolated  values  retained  the trend of the balance  sheet items movements, 
so they continued  to serve as an indicator of trend. 
The sources of funds include 1) all the long term debt issued by  the 
company,  2) short term debt which  is composed  of accounts payable,  notes 
payable,  federal  tax reserve,  accruals  and other current  liabilities  and 3) 
earned  surplus.  Since Minsky's  hypothesis  focuses on debt finance,  share 
issue was not recorded. 
The uses of funds include investment  expenditures  on plant  and equipment 
and on working  capital.  Working  capital  is the variable  inputs used  in 
production,  current  assets.  They are defined as the balance  sheet entries 
inventory,  cash, accounts  receivable,  securities,  insurance  (since market 
value was not available,  book value was used) and other current  assets. 19 
The financial  ratio analysis was  initiated at the level of the firm. 
These  firm ratios were  than transformed  into the two levels of aggregation: 
sectoral  and average  sized "firm".  In the construction  of the financial 
profile  for each sized firm, the annual value  of each variable  or ratio  is a 
simple mean produced  from the data on the firms in that size category.  These 
annual  averages were  organized  into the financial  statement  on each  "firm". 
For the sectoral  firm a weighted  average by total assets was used.  This 
weighting  scheme produced  a sectoral  "firm" that reflected  the relative  impact 
of each firm in the sector. 20 
ENDNOTES 
1.  In a study on the rise  in farm debt service payments  Paul Estenson  [1986] 
finds support for the Minsky hypothesis.  Martin Wolfson  [1986] investigates  this 
hypothesis  in the financial  sector.  His  findings  indicate  that in some cases 
there  is  a  build  up  in  debt  that  is  associated  with  an  expanding  economy. 
However,  Wolfson  finds  that  it  is  the  downturn  in profits,  not  increases  in 
interest rates that produce  the strain and difficulty  for the economy. 
2.  Schumpeter whose long waves depend upon technological  innovations published 
a highly  detailed  account  of the introduction  and spread  of these  innovations 
in  the  1920s  in his  two volume  piece,  Business  Cycles.  In his  theory  these 
industrial  innovations  are  responsible  for  the  rapid  growth  not  only  of  the 
industry and sector, but of the macroeconomy  as well. 
3. The determination  of the peaks and troughs of the cycles  in the 1920s is not 
without  controversy.  In contrast  to the NBER charting  other researchers,  such 
as  L.P.  Ayres  and  J.B.  Hubbard,  found  the  1927  recession  so  weak  as  to  be 
imperceptible,  and so have charted an uninterrupted  period  of growth  from 1924 
to 1929  [Burns and Mitchell,  1946:197-1111. 
4.  Olney  [1985], Oshima  [1961], and Juster  and Lipsey  [1967] argue that there 
was a revolution  in consumer  durables  expenditures  in the 1920's.  Vatter  and 
Thompson  [1966] take the stand that there was only a revolution  in expenditures 
on  automobiles  in  the  1920's.  The  former  argue  that  while  not  all  of  the 
industries  in consumer  durables  experienced  an  expansion  like  that  in autos, 
collectively  they  experienced  an  expansion  in  demand  that  was  qualitatively 
different  from their previous  growth patterns. 
5. The development  of new techniques for testing financial distress in firms has 
progressed  markedly  since  the 1960s.  The  initial works  of Beaver  [1966] and 
Altman  [1968]  have been extended to enable the forecasting of financial distress. 
However,  these  models  still  forecast  best  for  bankruptcy,  whereas  Minsky's 
hypothesis  does not  require  such a dire outcome.  Merely  a sustained  rise  in 
debt ratios or a sustained decline in the interest coverage ratio is sufficient 
to indicate  financial  fragility.  Given  the need  for a technique  sensitive  to 
small changes,  the outlined methodology  was deemed  the most appropriate. 
6. The measure  of value  for the variables  that form these ratios  is historical 
cost  for  capital  and  book  value  for  assets  and  debts.  While  the  primary 
rationale  for  their  use  is  data  availability,  they  were  also  considered  to 
provide  a true reflection  of the firm's value.  The use of historical  cost  in 
inflationary  periods  is criticized  for the distorted picture  of expansion  that 
it presents.  The  1920s were  not  an  inflationary  period;  they were  a  stable 
period.  The wholesale  price index [U.S. Dept. of Commerce,  1975:199]  indicates 
that for all of the years  in the decade  the values  fall between  a high of 53.3 
and a low of 49.1.  1920 is the exception with a value  of 79.6. 
The measure  of debt and asset value used  in this study, book value,  is not 
subject  to  inflationary  or  speculative  pressures.  It  is  an historical  cost 21 
valuation  of  the  firm determined  when  the share was  issued.  Changes  in book 
value  reflect  increases  or decreases  in outstanding  shares valued  at par. 
Another often used measure for assets and debt is their market value.  In non- 
speculative  periods,  market  value  of  shares  and  bonds  is  assumed  to  be  a 
reflection of the firm's long term profitability.  In speculative periods, market 
value  exceeds  actual value,  producing  an over-valued  picture  of the firm which 
tends to artificially  depress leverage values.  Given the stock market's  frantic 
activity,  especially  in the late 192Os, such a measure would be  inappropriate. 
7. The sector's initial debt position is more precarious than the ratios portray, 
for the 1920-21  recession  induced a price  deflation  that put  these  firms  into 
an even worse position in real terms.  Incorporating this initial price deflation 
with the price stability of the rest of the decade, underscores  the stronger real 
financial position  of the "firm" by 1929. 
8. In the Moodv's  credit  ratings  a bond with  a rating  under Baa  is considered 
to have  speculative  elements.  The  important  characteristics  of  a bond  to a 
potential  investor would be assurity  of  coupon payments  and in the longer run 
repayment  of  principal.  Speculative  elements  would  correspond  to  possible 
payment  defaults  in the case of future adverse periods. 
9.  Moody's  [1987:vi]  describes  a  B  rating  as  "...generally  lack[ing] 
characteristics  of the desirable investment.  Assurance of interest and  principal 
payments  or of maintenance  of other terms of the contract  over any long period 
of time may be small." 
10. The  different  problems  that small  firms  face  in terms  of  financing  their 
expansions are well documented (Jacoby and Saulnier, 1936; Merwin, 1939; Fazzari, 
Hubbard  and  Petersen,  1988).  The  continuation  of  the Reconstruction  Finance 
Corporation  as the Small Business Administration  is a clear  indication  of this 
specific problem  that small firms encounter. 
11. These  size categories  are based on the categorization  scheme used by Berle 
and Means  [1932].  Since their categories  were made with  a 1929 base  year and 
this study has a base year of 1919, a discount factor of 2.5 was employed.  This 
figure was based  on a very  conservative  compounded  annual  growth  rate of 2%. 22 
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SECTORALFIRN 
YEAR  PLANT  6  CURRENT  CURRENT  LONG-TERU  EARNED 
EQUIPMENT  ASSETS  DEBT  DEBT  SURPLUS 













80,373  165,594  56,565  10,976  89,095 
125,239  172,321  80,834  7,639  90,702 
123,836  110,137  59,489  8,466  72,534 
127,759  141,350  44,347  6,829  56,813 
145,096  197,613  57,047  6,542  153,213 
159,606  168,323  42,363  5,778  160,799 
166,065  254,898  66,952  3,467  193,095 
219,669  276,340  70,898  3,453  202,296 
239,344  290.139  75,739  2,781  227,592 
261,376  295,165  88,881  2,758  248,232 
281,101  278.237  71,261  673  305,370 
280,538  238,917  48,911  922  303,831 
1.  Components  may  not  sum  to  total  due  to  rounding  errors. 
TABLE  2 
LARGE  FIRM 
YEAR  PLANT  b  CURRENT  CURRENT  LONG-TERM  EARNED 
EQUIPMENT  ASSETS  DEBT  DEBT  SURPLUS 
(000)  (000)  (000)  (000)  (000) 
1919  61,936  146,676  54,049  10,396  73,735 
1920  90,406  148,620  65,512  9,784  70,316 
1921  89,655  130,277  48,458  13,052  59,674 
1922  89,490  121,179  32,144  13,277  75,460 
1923  100,507  165,183  40,806  12,069  119,083 
1924  110,856  178,988  32,790  10,961  127,657 
1925  116,876  209,287  46,587  8,015  152,042 
1926  146,149  221,128  46,878  7,981  165,460 
1927  157,869  220,722  48,864  6,528  175,067 
1928  170,120  226,990  59,751  6,348  105,933 
1929  179,200  217,557  50,213  2,418  225,081 
1930  177,581  214,765  33,736  2,238  225,664 
1.  Components  may  not  sum  to  total  due  to  rounding  errors. 













TD/NW'  ST/NW  LT/NW  QUICK  ST,'LT 
















0.11  0.09  1.82  0.64  7.79 
0.15  0.06  1.73  3.06  6.02 































0.79  310.01  2.92 
0.10 
0.47  1.56  2.54 
1.02  0.51  3.97 
0.12  1.07  0.44 
1.20  0.52 
6.38 
0.11  6.94 
0.05 
0.05 
1.83  3.81  5.61 
1.70  6.37  4.72 













50.56  3.51 
0.93  2.79 
0.40  3.82 
0.66  4.76 
0.62  4.59 
















RATIO TABLE  3 
MEDIUM  FiRJ4 
YEAR  PLANT&  CURRENT  CURRENT  LONG-TERM  EARNED 
EQUIPMENT  ASSETS  DEBT  DEBT  SURPLUS 
'000)  (000)  (000)  (000)  (000) 
TD/NW'  ST/NW  LT/NW  QUICK  ST/L7  CURREN'I 
RATIO 
1.46  4.20  6.87 
O.fi9  2.47 
1.38  1.66 
0.82  2.48 
1.69  3.68 
1.01  3.79 
1.89  3.40 
2.11  4.34 
1.81  3.90 
1.52  2.28 
1.48  3.46 
























7,335  16,303  7,934  a44  6,956  1.18 
9,075  18,069  11,396  1,476  5,394  1.17 
9,661  15,430  10,942  1,592  4,951  1.18 
9,48C  14,487  10,776  1,499  3,474  1.05 
10.543  21,067  9,918  836  4,906  0.55 
10,004  21,010  9,270  651  4,256  0.48 
10,034  20,981  8,710  582  4,622  0.44 
10,277  21,223  8,314  829  4,601  0.49 
9,597  22,299  9,242  747  4,962  0.54 
9,585  25,569  9.851  289  7,479  0.40 
15,352  33,722  15,102  2,154  9,006  0.50 

























1.  Components  may  not  sm  to  total  due  to  rounding  errors. 
TABLE  4 
SMALL  FIRM 
LONG-TERM  EARNED 
DEBT  SURPLUS 
YEAR  PLANT&  CURRENT  CURRENT 
EQUIPMENT  ASSETS  DEBT 
(000)  (000)  (000) 
TD/NW'  ST/NW  LT/NW  QUICK  ST/LT 
(000) 
1,502  0.32 
1,689  0.41 
1,558  0.39 
1,797  0.34 
1,683  0.32 
1,824  0.26 
1,658  0.29 
1,896  0.30 
1,934  0.30 
1,956  0.31 
2,257  0.34 




























2.19  1.17 
0.18  1.66  0.95 








































1,501  3,793 
1,939  4,459 
2,169  3,691 
2,159  4,044 
2,131  4,404 
2,321  4,507 
2,323  4,786 
2,314  5,060 
2,357  4,971 
2,353  5.331 
2.672  5.512 







843  340 
910  328 













1.  Components  may  not  sum  to  total  due  to  rounding  errors. 
c 